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CRIMINAL LAW IN MISSOURI-EVIDENCE
OF OTHER CRIMES*
EDWARD H. HUNVALD, JR.**
Those who bewail the passing of great (though sometimes non-existent)
traditions in the law will moan after reading State v. Stacey.1 In that case
the defendant was found guilty of "wilfully and maliciously killing a dumb
animal, Janie, a Seeing-Eye dog . . .- 2 The conviction was reversed be-
cause of the actions of the prosecuting attorney, who, in his closing argu-
ment, "went outside the record and quoted portions of the now historic
'Eulogy to a Dog' by Senator George Graham Vest" and then urged the
jury to "judge this matter with your hearts as well as your heads."' The
court concluded that this was designed to lead the jury to decide the case
on the basis of emotion instead of reason--"a course at war with unbiased
justice."a
Despite this and other advances in the methods and rules of criminal
trial practice, there are still areas where an eager prosecutor can follow a
course of conduct designed to lead the jury to decide cases on the basis of
emotion rather than reason. One such area is the use of evidence which
shows that the defendant has committed other crimes in addition to the
one for which he is being tried. There is a grave danger that such evidence
will lead the jury to convict the defendant simply because he is a "bad
man," and to ignore the shortcomings of the other evidence offered against
him. Unfortunately, the obvious course of excluding all evidence of the de-
*This article contains a discussion of selected 1961 and 1962 Missouri court
decisions reported in volumes 346-356, inclusive, Southwestern Reporter, Second
Series.
** Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri; A.B., Princeton, 1950;
LL.B., Harvard, 1953.
1. 355 S.W.2d 377 (St. L. Ct. App. 1962).
2. Id. at 378.
3. Id. at 380. The court paid due homage to Senator Vest by quoting his
famous speech in a footnote. 355 S.W.2d at 380. There was no evidence in the
record that Janie possessed the attributes of Old Drum. The court did not ponder
the question of whether or not Old Drum actually resembled the "noble dog"
described by Senator Vest, but merely pointed out that an appellate court never
ruled on the propriety of the eulogy in the case wherein it was delivered. See
Burden v. Hornsby, 50 Mo. 238 (1872).
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fendant's criminal past is not a satisfactory solution, for often the evidence
of other crimes has a legitimate use as well as an illegitimate and prejudi-
cial effect. The rules of admissibility of evidence of other crimes are the
results of an effort to compromise, to balance, the risk of undue prejudice
and the legitimate probative value of such evidence. This effort has naturally
resulted in inconsistencies and, in some cases, outright confusion.
It is an accepted rule that in a criminal trial, the state may not intro-
duce evidence of the bad character of the defendant unless and until the
defendant attempts to show the existence of his good character. The reason
for this rule is not that the defendant's character is irrelevant in a criminal
prosecution, for the opposite is most certainly true. The defendant is al-
lowed to introduce evidence of his good character as circumstantial evidence
of his innocence.7 For example, he may show his character for honesty in
a stealing case, or for peaceableness in an assault case. By the same token,
his character for dishonesty or for violence would also be relevant. But such
evidence of bad character is excluded because "the danger of prejudice
outweighs the probative value.",, However, once the defendant has offered
evidence of his good character, the prosecution can rebut this with evidence
of the defendant's bad character and can show his prior convictions and
iniquities.9
There are, of course, instances where the evidence of other offenses is
relevant for other purposes than as illustrations of the defendant's char-
acter. In such situations the evidence is usually admissible.10 In State v.
Johnson,"1 the defendant was charged with having robbed A. Evidence
6. State v. Hayes, 356 Mo. 1033, 204 S.W.2d 723 (1947). See generally 1
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 57 (3d ed. 1940).
7. McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE 333 (1954); 1 WIGMORE, OP. cit. sTpra note 6,
§§ 55, 56.
8. McConmicx, op. cit. supra note 7, at 327. There are also the dangers of
confusion of issues and undue consumption of time and surprise. Id. at 325.
"The policy precluding the state from initially attacking the appellant's
character is the avoidance of 'uncontrollable and undue prejudice, and possible un-just condemnation, which such evidence might induce."' State v. Hayes, supra note
6, at 1036, 204 S.W.2d at 725, quoting from 1 WIGMORE, op. Cit. Supra note 6, § 57.
9. For a recent example, see State v. Withers, 347 S.W.2d 146, 150 (Mo.
1961). Defendant was charged with immoral molestation of a female minor. On
direct examination the defendant testified that apart from the present incident he
had not been arrested or in any kind of trouble. This was sufficient to allow the
prosecution to question the defendant about prior charges, arrests and misconduct.
10. "The rule is that the prosecution may not introduce evidence of other
criminal acts of the accused unless the evidence is substantially relevant for some
other purpose than to show a probability that he committed the crime on trial
because he is a man of criminal character." MCCORMICK, op. cit. sn pra note 7, at
327.
11. 347 S.W.2d 220 (Mo. 1961).
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was received that the defendant and three confederates interrupted a poker
game and robbed A and five other persons. The evidence of the robbery of
the five other persons was admissible to show the defendant's guilt of rob-
bing A. It would have been almost impossible to give the jury an accurate
impression of the robbery of A without also showing the other robberies.12 A
similar result was reached in State v. Adamso. 13 The defendant there was
convicted of forgery of a check. Evidence of his and his confederates' activ-
ities prior to the passing of the check in question was received. This evidence
indicated the commission of other offenses which, unlike those in Jovnsont
did not occur at the same time as the offense charged. No error was commit-
ted in receiving this evidence, the appellate court stating that it would have
been impossible to show the "printing, preparation, and writing" of the
check in question without showing the prior events. "The State is not to
be penalized if the parties so entangle their illegal affairs that one offense
cannot be proved without also proving others."' 5
Evidence of the defendant's other crimes may be relevant to show
motive, intent, identity, knowledge and any number of other facts which
indicate guilt of the offense charged.1 6 However, the courts usually require
that the other crime be closely related in some manner to the offense
charged. In State v. Stegal, 17 for instance, it was held that error was com-
mitted in the reception of other crime evidence.1 8 The defendant was charged
with obtaining money by means of false pretenses.1 9 Evidence was admit-
12. Charges of these five "other" robberies were pending against the defendant.
See also the related case of State v. Ashe, 350 S.W.2d 768 (Mo. 1961), affirming
the conviction of a confederate involved in the same robberies. Ashe had been
tried and acquitted of the robbery of another of the poker players. The court
stated that the defendant's protection against harassment by multiple trials when
double jeopardy does not apply rests with the discretion of the prosecutor. Un-
fortunately, the court did not give any indication of the factors that the prosecutor
should use in exercising this discretion.
13. 346 S.W.2d 85 (Mo. 1961). See also State v. Moore, 353 S.W.2d 712 (Mo.
1962).
14. Supra note 11.
15. State v. Adamson, supra note 13, at 87.
16. For a partial listing of such factors, see McCoRMIcK, op. cit. sulpra note 7,
at 328-33. Cf. UNIFORM RULE OF EvMENcE 55: "[S]uch evidence is admissible
when relevant to prove some other material fact including absence of mistake or
accident, motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge or identity."
17. 353 S.W.2d 656 (Mo. 1962).
18. The conviction was reversed because of a defective information, which
failed to allege that the party supposed to have been defrauded relied upon the
misrepresentations or believed them and was thus induced by them to part with
the money.
19. The case is also interesting for its discussion of the relationship between
the Missouri stealing statute, § 560.156, RSMo 1959, and the confidence game
statute, § 561A50, RSMo 1959. The language of both statutes is broad enough
[Vol. 27
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ted that the defendant had obtained automobile junk motors by false
pretenses some 14 months after the occurrence of the crime charged, and
that defendant had evidently cheated his partner by withholding the profits
received in an enterprise some 10 months prior to the commission of the
crime charged. The court ruled that this was error. After stating that in
prosecutions for obtaining property by means of false pretenses, evidence
of similar offenses is admissible to prove criminal intent, the court pointed
out that these offenses were too removed in time from the offense charged,
and, in addition, that one of the situations was materially different in
that it did not involve the use of any false pretenses.
With character evidence inadmissible until the defendant opens up
the area, and the limitations of relevancy and remoteness on evidence of
prior misconduct to show some element of the crime charged,20 it would
seem that the problems of the admissibility of evidence of other crimes
would not arise too often, and, that when they did, the rules would provide
a fairly adequate solution in avoiding the dangers of prejudice as much
as is reasonably possible without prohibiting the use of such evidence alto-
gether.
Unfortunately, the problem is not that easily solved, for evidence of
other crimes is admissible for purposes other than showing the guilt of
the defendant. One standard use of such evidence and one that presents
great opportunities for abuse is the use of evidence of other crimes to im-
peach the defendant after he has taken the stand and testified in his own
behalf.21
State v. Hmt 22 illustrates a number of problems involved in impeach-
ing the defendant-witness. The defendant had been charged and convicted
of speeding. That conviction was reversed and the case remanded for a
to cover the crime of obtaining property by means of false pretenses. The court
indicated that the stealing statute should be used for the ordinary type of false
pretenses, while the confidence game statute should be used for those swindles that
involve gaining the victim's confidence. This distinction is somewhat tenuous, but it
may be the only one possible, since the legislature when enacting the stealing statute
for some reason did not repeal the confidence game statute, although it did repeal
the statutes on larceny, embezzlement and false pretenses. For an example of the
stealing statute covering a "con" game, see State v. Murphy, 347 S.W.2d 230 (Mo.
1961).
20. Even where the evidence of other offense is relevant for some purpose, it
may still be error to admit it if it is cumulative or if the fact it shows is not par-
ticularly important. Cf. State v. Griffin, 336 S.W.2d 364 (Mo. 1960).
21. On the areas covered by this article, see generally Bishop, Impeachment
and Rehabilitation of Witness By Character Evidence in Missouri, 20 Mo. L. REV.
142, 273 (1955).
22. 352 S.W.2d 57 (K.C. Ct. App. 1961).
1962]
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new trial.23 At the second trial, the defendant took the stand and testified
in his own behalf. The prosecution then asked the defendant if he had
not been convicted of driving ninety-five miles per hour in a sixty mile
zone and paid a fine of fifty dollars.24 After objection by the defense was
overruled, the witness admitted that he had been so convicted. This convic-
tion had occurred after the first trial on the present charge of speeding, but,
of course, prior to the second trial.
As indicated above, the other conviction for speeding was not admis-
sible to show the defendant's character, as the defendant had not offered
evidence to show his good character. Nor would the other instance of
speeding seem to be relevant in any way to the guilt of the offense charged.
Evidence of conduct on one occasion is not usually admissible to prove
conduct on another occasion.2r However, the evidence was ruled proper in
this case as a means of impeaching the defendant-witness.
When the defendant takes the stand and testifies in his own behalf,
he is subject, in Missouri, to impeachment in the same fashion as any
other witness. 25 The fact that he is the defendant and that there is grave
danger of prejudice from the showing of prior crimes, does not, in Missouri,
prevent the showing of prior crimes to impeach him. In some states, the
defendant-witness is accorded protections that the ordinary witness does
not have,27 and there are good reasons for according him these protections.
28
If the defendant does not take the stand, he runs the risk of the jury using
his silence as evidence of his guilt (despite the supposed impropriety of such
a conclusion). If he has a defense, but by taking the stand is forced to con-
cede the existence of a prior "record," there is a grave danger that the
jury will use this prior record, particularly if it includes crimes that are
23. State v. Hunt, 335 S.W.2d 506 (K.C. Ct. App. 1960).
24. Brief for Respondent, p. 10, State v. Hunt, s.pra note 22.
25. Thus, in State v. Hyde, 234 Mo. 200, 224, 136 S.W. 316, 322 (1910), it
was stated:
One who commits one crime may be more likely to commit another; yet,
logically, one crime does not prove another, nor tend to prove another,
unless there is such a relation between them that proof of one tends to
prove the other...
The rule [of exclusion of other crime evidence], therefore, rests upon
two grounds: First, the impropriety of inferring from the commission of
one crime that the defendant is guilty of another, and, second, the con-
stitutional objection to compelling a defendant to meet charges of which
the indictment gives no information.
26. "[Alnd may be contradicted and impeached as any other witness in the
case; .. ." § 546.260, RSMo 1959.
27. See Annot., 161 A.L.R. 233 (1946).
28. See McCoRmIcK, op. cit. supra note 7, at 93-94.
[Vol. 27
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similar to the one charged, as evidence of his guilt, despite any limiting in-
structions that may be given.29 On the other hand, if this type of impeach-
ment is foreclosed as to a defendant-witness, then it does allow the defend-
ant to appear as a blameless person. This consideration has led most courts
to allow some kind of impeachment by showing prior crimes of the defend-
ant-witness.
However, in the Hunt case, the prior offense was that of speeding, and
it is difficult to see any relation between this conviction and the defendant-
witness' credibility. A Missouri statute provides that a person who has
been convicted of a criminal offense is a competent witness "but the con-
viction may be proved to affect his credibility."3' 0 While this statute allows
impeachment by showing prior convictions, it does not follow that a con-
viction for speeding is relevant to credibility, nor that such a conviction
should be used to impeach. The Missouri courts have reached this illogical
result by reasoning that:
section 491.050 expressly permits proof of a prior conviction of
a witness of a criminal offense to affect his credibility, . Section
556.010 defines a "criminal offense" to mean any offense, misde-
meanor or felony, for which any imprisonment or fine, or both, may
by law be inflicted. By virtue of the foergoing statutes, the right
of the State to cross-examine defendant with reference to a prior
conviction for operating a motor vehicle without a driver's license
was clearly lawful.31
The difficulty with this theory is that it assumes that the legislature,
in enacting these statutes, meant to allow evidence of all convictions to
impeach even though there was no relevant connection between the con-
viction and the integrity of the witness. However, such an approach does
have the merit of ease of administration, and when there is a doubtful re-
lationship between prior crimes and the defendant's integrity, it is arguable
29. On the duty of the court to give a limiting instruction, see State v. Chaney,
349 S.W.2d 238 (Mo. 1961) (en banc), where a majority of the court held that
where an incorrect limiting instruction is requested, the trial court is under a duty
to give a correct limiting instruction. See also State v. Baldwin, 349 S.W.2d 212
(Mo. 1961), where the lower court committed reversible error by giving a "char-
acter" instruction after other prosecution evidence had been introduced only for
impeachment purposes.
30. § 491.050, RSMo 1959.
31. State v. Cox, 333 S.W.2d 25, 29 (Mo. 1960). The defendant had been
convicted of manslaughter arising out of an automobile accident.
1962]
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that the jury should decide how much, if any, weight to give to such
evidence2
While in any other case the jury would have little difficulty in seeing
the lack of relationship between speeding and reliability as a witness, and
also would not be unduly prejudiced against a person because he has been
convicted of speeding, yet there does seem to be a very real danger that
when the defendant is charged with speeding, the jury is apt to use this
evidence to infer his guilt of the present charge. Certainly, in cases like
the Hunt case, it seems clear that the danger of misuse of the evidence
of conviction of speeding far outweighs its questionable value as an attack
upon the credibility of the witness.
Limitations upon the type of prior offenses that can be used to impeach
are difficult to apply. Allowing the use of only those crimes that are fel-
onies or that involve "moral turpitude," or which are "infamous" crimes,
may result in inconsistencies and the necessity of highly refined rules of
classification. However, it does not seem to be too difficult to have a rule
that will exclude the use of violations of traffic regulations."
If the use of the prior conviction to impeach were all that was involved
in State v. Hunt, the case would be little more than an example of the wide-
open Missouri approach in this area. However, the defense was not con-
tent to let the matter drop with the admission on cross-examination by the
32. State v. Ransom, 340 Mo. 165, 174, 100 S.W.2d 294, 298 (1936):
The jury must determine the creditability of witnesses. It needs no argu-
ment to demonstrate that conviction of an offense of one kind, say a
trivial misdemeanor, would not affect the creditability of a witness to
the same extent as would conviction of some heinous offense involving
moral turpitude.
33. Prior to the enactment of the present impeachment statute, the rule in
Missouri was that only convictions of felonies or of petit larceny could be used
to impeach a witness. The present statute was not too kindly received by the
Missouri Supreme Court:
While we doubt very seriously the wisdom of this sudden and apparently
unnecessary change of the long-established rules of evidence, which have
been uniformly followed for so many years, doubtless on account of their
being based upon that most appropriate foundation of reason and justice,
yet, if this change is unwise and was ill-considered, the more strictly it
is enforced the sooner its defects will appear, and the sooner will the
power that created it bring about its destruction.
State v. Blitz, 171 Mo. 530, 542, 71 S.W. 1027, 1030 (1903). In its zeal for strict
enforcement, the court overlooked the possibility of interpreting the statute to
exclude the use of convictions which bore no necessary relation to integrity. The
result is that now, use of any criminal conviction is the rule that has been "uni-
formly followed for so many years," and will probably be considered by those who
are familiar with it as "based upon the most appropriate foundation of reason andjustice."
[Vol. 27
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defendant of his prior conviction. The defendant was then asked on re-
direct if he had pleaded guilty to the prior offense. After an affirmative reply,
the defendant was asked why he had pleaded guilty to the other offense.
The defendant answered that he had pleaded guilty "because I was guilty.""3
The implication of this testimony is, of course, that when the defendant
had been speeding, he admitted it (and presumably took his punishment
like a man) and, obversely, when he had not been speeding, he would deny
any such charge made against him.
The only difficulty with this apparent attempt at rehabilitation of the
defendant-witness is that it is irrelevant to the impeaching qualities of
the prior conviction." If it is improper for the state to try to show the de-
fendant's guilt of the charge of speeding by showing another instance of
speeding, it would seem equally inappropriate for the defense to try to
show the truthfulness of his plea of "not guilty" by showing a prior truthful
plea of "guilty."
Moreover, the inference which is supposed to be drawn from the prior
conviction is that because of the conduct which led to the conviction, the
defendant-witness possesses some type of moral defect which affects his
credibility. It is the crime for which the defendant was convicted that sup-
posedly illustrates this moral defect, not whether he pleaded guilty to the
charge. It might be argued that the defendant-witness' plea of guilty to
the other charge of speeding is an indication of his remorse about the prior
event and shows some degree of reformation of the moral defect that the
other conviction is supposed to reveal. However, it seems doubtful that this
was the inference that the defense was seeking to have the jury draw
from the defendant's testimony.
Perhaps such rehabilitation should be allowed because it gives the
34. State v. Hunt, supra note 22, at 59.
35. On the right to explain the former conviction, see Annot., 166 A.L.R. 211(1947). Cf. State v. Kimmell, 156 Mo. App. 461, 471, 137 S.W. 329, 332 (Spr. Ct.
App. 1911):
The fact that defendant had been convicted was the only fact that was
admissible .... To permit the defendant to explain the circumstances of
the conviction for the purpose of destroying or weakening the effect of
the conviction would have been to open up a reinvestigation of the former
case; for, if the defendant were permitted to explain, the state should also
be permitted to rebut that explanation, and, if this course were adopted,
it would result in a retrial of the former case, and the effect of the record
of the result of that trial would be disputed by the oral testimony of wit-
nesses, and thus a judgment of a court of record would be contradicted
by oral testimony, and this cannot be done.
See also State v. Jones, 249 Mo. 80, 155 S.W. 33 (1913).
19621
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defendant an opportunity to offset the improper inferences that the jury
might draw from the prior conviction. In the Hmt case the jury might
well reason (improperly, of course) that a man convicted of speeding once
is apt to speed again. ° It is also not beyond belief that the prosecutor
was aware of this improper inference when he brought up the matter of
the prior conviction. So perhaps it is only fair to allow the -defendant an
opportunity to rebut this evidence, not only as it bears upon his credibility
but also as it bears upon his guilt. In any event, in the Huvnt case, there was
no objection to the defendant's testimony as to why he pleaded guilty.
This was not, however, the end of the affair, for after the defendant tes-
tified that he pleaded guilty because he "was guilty," the prosecutor asked
him: "[D]on't you think the fact that you had this young lady in the car
with you had anything to do with your entering a plea of guilty?"
3' 7
The defendant's motion for a mistrial was overruled, and on the appeal
the court ruled that there was no error in denying this motion. The appel-
late court, in fact, indicated that there is nothing wrong with this question,
as the defendant had opened up the area by testifying as to why he had
pleaded guilty.88
Without regard to the correctness of the appellate court's decision, it
seems clear that this trial on a charge of speeding moved quite a way
from the issues relevant to that charge. The impeachment process was car-
ried to its illogical extreme-to the exploration of the possibility of (and
the inference of) some type of immoral behavior on the part of the defend-
ant by being in the company of an unmarried woman on a night approx-
imately two years after the incident which was supposed to be subject of
the trial.8o Yet, since this evidence grew out of an attempt to impeach
the witness, it was somehow not an inquiry into character, evidence of
which, of course, is not admissible. It would have been better if the ev-
idence of the other offense could have been excluded altogether.
36. Since the speeding which led to the prior conviction occurred after the
events leading to the charge for which the defendant was on trial, the inference
might even be stronger, since one might reason that a person who has been
arrested and charged with the offense of speeding would be exceptionally careful
thereafter.
37. Brief for Appellant, pp. 17-18, State v. Hunt, supra note 22.
38. The court relied upon § 546.260, RSMo 1959, which permits the cross-
examination of a defendant in a criminal case "as to any matter referred to in his
examination in chief...."
39. The offense charged allegedly occurred on January 19, 1958. The con-
viction of speeding used to impeach occurred on May 19, 1960. Brief for the
Appellant, p. 17, State v. Hunt, supra note 22.
[Vol. 27
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Prior misconduct need not have resulted in a conviction in order for
it to be admissible to impeach a witness. There are, however, some dis-
tinctions between using prior convictions to impeach and using prior mis-
conduct as to which there has been no conviction. O
In State v. Foster;" the defendant was charged with robbery in the
first degree. A defense witness testified to facts which, if believed, would
show alibi; that the defendant was somewhere other than the scene of the
crime. On cross examination the prosecutor asked the witness42 if he had
not admitted to the police that he, the witness, had planned and attempted
to rob the Fort Wood Theatre. Before there was a ruling on the defense
counsel's objection, the witness stated, "I'll answer the question for you...
No, sir, it is not true, I haven't admitted to trying to rob anything." The
question was repeated in substance and the witness answered, "Not no
Fort Wood Theatre; no, sir.'' When asked if he had not admitted to
the police that he had planned and attempted to rob the Fort Wood Drive-
in Theatre, the witness became hesitant, and after objections by counsel
had been overruled, the witness stated that he had made such a statement
to the police but only after being beaten.44
On appeal it was argued that the trial court erred in allowing this
cross-examination. The appellate court rejected this contention, stating
first that the witness had waived his privilege against self-incrimination by
volunteering his answer.A5 The court then went on to say:
While it is error to ask a witness if he has been arrested for or
charged with a crime, there is an obvious distinction if he is asked
if he committed the crime, and we conclude this distinction extends
to asking him if he has admitted committing an offense.46
40. See MCCORMICK, op. cit. supra note 7, at 87-97. The two basic distinctions
are that allowing such impeachment by use of offenses which have not resulted in
convictions is within the discretion of the court and, that in such impeachment,
the examiner must "take the answer" of the witness; that is, he cannot introduce
extrinsic evidence of the misconduct.
41. 349 S.W.2d 922 (Mo. 1961).
42. Although the witness here was not the defendant, and therefore there is
not the same problem of prejudice, the rules of cross-examination are supposed to
be the same. See § 546.260, RSMo 1959.
43. Supra note 41, at 924.
44. Ibid.
45. If the witness was also the defendant, there would have been a waiver,
when he took the stand, of his privilege against self-incrimination as to his testi-
mony on direct and as to matters of impeachment.
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It is hoped that this little bit of illogic will not be enshrined as the
"law" in Missouri. The law on impeachment by showing other offenses is
much too confused as it is. It is proper, although controlled by the discre-
tion of the court, to inquire into the commission of other crimes for pur-
poses of impeachment, even though there has been no conviction. 47 It is
also true that inquiries into mere arrests or charges are not permitted for
the purpose of impeachment. But to conclude that there is no difference
between asking about the commission of a prior offense and asking about
a statement admitting the commission of a prior offense is to ignore an
important distinction.
If a person has committed a crime and the commission of this crime
is relevant to showing his unreliability as a witness, then it is an accepted
and proper method of impeachment to show the existence of the crime. If
there is no conviction, then the manner of showing the commission of the
crime is to get the witness to admit on the witness stand that he has com-
mitted the offense. The fact that a witness has made an out-of-court state-
ment admitting the commission of a crime is not relevant to his impeach-
ment unless the out-of-court statement is true and can be considered as
evidence of the commission of the crime.48 If the out-of-court statement is
false, then it is no evidence of the commission of the crime. 9 So, in order
for the jury to use this evidence, they must first determine whether or not
it is true.
Evidence of arrests and charges is not admissible to impeach for sev-
eral reasons. First, prior arrests and charges are not very reliable indi-
cators of misconduct. There are too many times when innocent persons
have been arrested for or charged with the commission of crimes. In order
for a jury to decide what weight to give to evidence of an arrest or charge,
it would be necessary to go into the details of the incident. To do so would
involve the exploration of side issues with resultant expense in time and
47. Cf. State v. Cox, 352 S.W.2d 665 (Mo. 1961), holding that the trial court
did not err in its refusal to allow the defense to inquire of a prosecution witness
whether she was a prostitute and earned her living by immoral means, and
whether she was a dope addict or was under the influence of drugs on the night
of the crime and at trial.
48. This, of course, raises the problem of hearsay. Statements admitting
criminal liability are in some jurisdictions considered to fall within the hearsay ex-
ception of declarations against interest. Cf. Sutter v. Easterly, 354 Mo. 282, 189
S.W.2d 284 (1945). See also Annot., 162 A.L.R. 446 (1946). Of course, before the
declaration against interest exception will apply, the declarant must be unavailable
as a witness.
49. It would, however, show the existence of an untrue statement made by
the witness, but this would clearly be a statement as to a collateral matter.
[Vol. 27
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the confusion of the issues. Because arrests and charges are not reliable in-
dicators of moral deficiency, they can not be used to impeach a witness. 0
It is submitted that the same reasoning applies to out-of-court statements
which admit the commission of other crimes. A person's out-of-court admis-
sion of criminal conduct may be more reliable than a person's arrest as
an indication of moral deficiency, but it still has elements of unreliability
and it will involve time and confusion to go into the details of the admis-
sion. Perhaps the best reason for refusing to allow an inquiry into out-of-
court admissions is that it is not the least bit necessary. The prosecuting
attorney could simply have asked whether the witness had committed the
crime.51 It is the commission of the crime, not the confession of it, that is
relevant to the impeachment of the witness.52
A defendant who has a record of convictions may be able to prevent
the prosecution from introducing this record into evidence. If the defend-
ant does not offer evidence of his good character, the state cannot show
his prior criminal record as evidence of his bad character; if the defendant
does not take the stand and testify, the state cannot show the prior record
as a means of impeachment. Thus, unless some particular misconduct is
relevant to the present charge, the prior record of the defendant should not
be introduced into evidence. Until recently, however, the defendant's prior
record could be introduced into evidence, not because it was relevant to
guilt, not to show bad character, not to impeach the defendant, but for the
jury to use in adjudging the sentence to be imposed should they find the de-
fendant guilty.53 By some feat of mental magic, the jury was supposed to
50. Cf. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 980a (3d ed. 1940). There is also, of course,
the problem of hearsay involved in the accusation.
51. Cf. State v. Gridley, 353 S.W.2d 705 (Mo. 1962), where the court ruled
that no error had been committed by the trial court's censoring an attorney for
asking, "I saw in the paper where you and two other fellows were charged with a
strong armed robbery... ." Id. at 707.
52. Perhaps the objection to this case is somewhat academic. If the witness
had been asked if he had committed the crime of attempted robbery of the the-
atre and had denied it, the court might then allow the prosecutor to inquire into
the admission of the crime, not for the purpose of using the admission as evidence
of character and thus to impeach, but as an effort to get the witness to retract
his original denial.
53. § 556.280, RSMo 1949. "Prior to the 1959 amendment the provisions of
Section 556.280 required that evidence of the prior conviction, imprisonment and
discharge of a defendant be presented to the jury as a part of the State's case, and
the jury was instructed, upon a finding of those facts, together with a finding of
guilt as to the subsequent offense, to fix the punishment at the longest term of
imprisonment prescribed therefor." State v. Morton, 338 S.W.2d 858, 861 (Mo.
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ignore the prior record when it was introduced for sentencing purposes until
they found the defendant guilty.
Fortunately, under the new habitual criminal statute,5" this practice
of letting the jury hear evidence of prior convictions for sentencing pur-
poses has been done away with. Now the existence of the prior record is de-
termined by the judge out of the hearing of the jury. If he finds the nec-
essary record to exist, then, if the jury finds the defendant guilty, the
judge decides what the sentence is to be.55
The advantages of this new practice are obvious. The prior record can
be considered as a factor in determining what sentence is appropriate, but
the danger of prejudice is removed, provided, of course, that the prior rec-
ord is not admissible for some other purpose. Despite the fact that this
new procedure is, by and large, more beneficial to a defendant with a past
record than was the old procedure, it still was attacked in a number of
cases by defendants who were sentenced in accordance with it. The attacks
were based primarily upon claims that the application of the new procedure
was ex post facto and that it violated defendant's right to trial by jury.
These claims, and others, were rejected by the court.56
Thus, in the area of sentencing, the problem of achieving a proper
balance between the usefulness of evidence of other offenses and the danger
of prejudice from such evidence has been solved by removing the issue
(and the evidence) from the jury.7 It is unlikely that Missouri will adopt
a rule preventing the use of evidence of other offenses to impeach a de-
fendant-witness, but perhaps a better balance than we now have may
someday be achieved in that area.
54. § 556.280, RSMo 1959. For a case in which the court considered, for sen-
tencing purposes, evidence of offenses which had not resulted in convictions, see
State v. Zavalcofski, 349 S.W.2d 942 (Mo. 1961).
55. Another improvement made by the new statute is that the court is not
required to impose the most severe sentence allowed for the subsequent offense.
56. State v. Donnell, 351 S.W.2d 775 (Mo. 1961); State v. Colbert, 344 S.W.2d
115 (Mo. 1961); State v. Chamineak, 343 S.W.2d 153 (Mo. 1961); State v. Wil-
liams, 343 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. 1961); State v. Wolfe, 343 S.W.2d 10 (Mo.), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 953, 368 U.S. 907 (1961), petition for habeaus corpus denied,
Wolfe v. Nash, 205 F. Supp. 219 (W.D. Mo. 1962); State v. Payne, 342 S.W.2d 950
(Mo. 1961); State v. Griffin, 339 S.W.2d 803 (Mo. 1961); State v. Morton, 338
S.W.2d 858 (Mo. 1960).
57. But see State v. Colbert, supra note 56, where defendant argued that
when the judge did not instruct the jury as to the sentence, the jury would realize
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